During a layover in Dallas Fort Worth, with little else to do, I wandered the bookshops in search of postcards. I happened upon Godel, Escher, Bach on a shelf and decided now was as good a time as any to read it.
Eight pages into the author’s preface, Hofstadter writes that although he writes (presumably metaphorically?) about formal mathematics having a “self”, he did not mean to say that mathematics was a conscious person, and that human brains are much more convoluted than the rules of mathematics. He said that there is no equivalent in a mathematical system to the passage of time, change, birth, and death.
Even the preface is hard to read. It isn’t intentionally confusing; in fact, Hofstadter tries to say things as clearly as possible. It is difficult because I have to spend a couple minutes thinking after each paragraph.
And I guess everything comes back to our existence and the fate thereof. A very few weeks ago, a simple discussion of eating habits turned into a question on the sentience of animals, in which Pesto put forth a definition I hadn’t heard before. He said that sentience was a preference to continue to exist. He said that sentient beings gained utility from thinking that they would continue to exist.
I was reminded of other similar talks I’d had, where we’d tried to figure out what was a person, and what was a consciousness, and if we were all starting with the same premises (we were all atheists and monists (people who believe the self does not exist outside the physical body, that is, the perception of self ends when the brain is destroyed)), how come we couldn’t reach the same conclusion? The trouble was that the majority of Rationality Camp, by the end of summer, would happily walk through a teleporter, and I adamantly refused to consider it. I tried to explain why. Somewhy, I couldn’t communicate what I wanted to say, and we couldn’t even suggest an experiment, because whatever experiment was suggested, all of us (myself included) agreed on the expected results.
How can we expect ourselves to behave differently in the same situation when our models of the world produce the same expected experimental results in every observable detail?
The explanation came some months later from Solar Wind, who had been my teacher over the summer. The trouble was that most of the Rationality Camp rationalists were confident that in the case of the teleporter, there was one person involved, but I was not confident whether there was one or two, and I was therefore unwilling to take the risk. Perhaps I’d feel differently if I knew enough quantum physics to be convinced very small particles are not just indistinguishable, but also not possessed of any individual identities. Even if I were, I doubt I’d be confident enough to walk through a teleporter.
At this point, things look a lot like a continuity of consciousness issue, and that’s very strange. If I am frozen and then re-animated, is that continuous? If some parts of my brain shut down for a night, is that continuous? If one brain cell were replaced at a time. . . but that’s particularly strange. Brain cells are being replaced all the time.
A different person, the Programming Musician, once asked me these things, hoping to make me less afraid of the teleporter, but I actually became afraid to sleep, afraid to blink, and afraid of the passage of time. I anticipate experiencing tomorrow. When I sleep, I am convinced that only one person is involved. But how can I tell if that’s true? I remember experiencing yesterday, and I remember feeling things. I was playing Terraria, and I was frustrated when my character got eaten by a bonedragon, and I remember what that feels like, and I remember feeling those things! But of course I’d remember that; they are stored in the physical configuration of neurons in my brain. It could be that all those years I remember living were experienced by a different consciousness, and I only think it was the same one as now because I have memories of them, and there’s no experimental way to tell the difference! “What do you mean, a different consciousness?” A person with my brain, regardless of what consciousness is experiencing it, would behave the same way. I have no doubt that whoever walked out the other end of the teleporter would behave the same way as myself, and be indistinguishable from myself, and be truly and rightfully me (with the one exception that afterwards she would not fear teleporters (although she would remember this argument and might resist them even with the experience of going through one once and feeling like it was ok)). But I don’t anticipate walking out of the teleporter! What does that even mean? Should I anticipate waking up in the morning?
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